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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

African Regional Groupings: A Status Report

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15 November 1972 No. 2434/72

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INTELLIGENCE REFORT

African Regional Groupings: A Status Report

Coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working together is success -Henry Ford

Apart from displaying a remarkable capacity for survival, the performance of regional groupings in Africa has not been spectacular. The African countries have made some headway in the direction of closer ties, but the gains have been small and uneven. Nonetheless, the Africans are gradually becoming more aware of the need for greater cooperation amongst themselves. African regions have only just entered their second decade of independence and collaboration. Nonetheless, in spite of the many obstacles to unity, the impetus for greater cooperation is slowly increasing.

Although the Arab states of North Africa have made a stab at limited cooperation and white-ruled South Africa finds it expedient to collaborate with some of its black-governed neighbors, the search for satisfactory forms of cooperation is of special concern to the nations of black Africa. Here a large array of inter-governmental organizations are found. African regional groupings range in size from a union of two countries to attempts at continental unity and serve many different political and economic purposes. Most, however, are small and weak groupings that lack both the resources and administrative machinery to play the ambitious roles they have assumed.

Note: This report was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.

i

PRINCIPAL AFRICAN REGIONAL GROUPINGS: FUNCTION

Grouping	Effective	Headquarters	Stated Aims
Organization of African Unity	May 63	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	promote continental solidarity and cooperation; defend members' sovereignty and territorial integrity; eradicate all forms of colonialism; coordinate Africa's social and economic development
Economic Commission for Africa I	1958	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	facilitate concerted African economic and social progress; strengthen economic relations among members; and with outside world; development research and planning; production of technical information
African Develop- ment Bank	Sep 64	Abidjan, Ivory Coast	plan and finance African development projects; mobilize all source investment capital
Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization	Jun 66	Yaounde, Cameroon	reinforce OAU's mission; political consultation; suppression of subversion; cooperation in economic, social, technical, cultural fields
Conference of East and Central African States	Apr 66	no permanent secretariat	promote better bilateral relations and mutual political and economic co- operation
Council of the Entente	Aug 60	Abidjan, Ivory Coast	coordination of foreign and economic policies; promotion of common economic development and technical cooperation
Organization for the Development of the Senegal River	Mar 72	Dakar, Senegal	ensure navigational freedom on and co- ordinated development of Senegal River
West African Customs Union	Dec 66	Ouagadougou, Upper Volta	gradual establishment of a protected free trade zone

¹A UN Body

ii

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
Grouping	Effective	Headquarters	Stated Aims
West African Economic Community	first day of calendar year follow- ing date on which rati- fied by 5 sig natories	,	progressive establishment of common market; harmonized development of agriculture, industry, and transport
Liptako-Gourma Authority	Jun 71	Ouagadougou, Upper Volta	common development of resources of tri-state Liptako-Gourma region
Nigeria-Togo Economic Union	Jun 72	yet to be deter- mined	cooperation in transport, telecom- munications, trade, industry, and fiscal matters
Lake Chad Basin Commission	May 64	Fort Lamy, Chad	regulate navigation on Lake Chad; promote cooperative use and development of Lake Chad basin
Niger River Commission	late 65	Niamey, Niger	formulate navigational rules and projects to develop resources of Niger river basin
Central African Customs and Economic Union	Jan 66	Bangui, Central African Republic	progressive establishment of common market; balanced and integrated economic development, especially in industry and transport
Union of Central African States	Apr 68	Fort Lamy, Chad	gradual establishment of regional market with common transport and telecommunications; coordination of economic policy and development; mutual security cooperation
East African Community	Dec 67	Arusha, Tanzania	eventual common market, accelerated and balanced economic development, administration of common infrastruc- ture services and research activities
Regional Economic Organization of the Maghreb	Cct 64	Tunis, Tunisia	expanded economic and cultural co- operation; eventual Maghrebian com- munity
Southern African Customs Union	Mar 70	Pretoria, South Airica	establishment of area of generally free trade; stimulation of economic development and diversification of poorer members

iii

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ALGERIA-1962

Housri Boumediene, Pres. of Revolutionary Council Population=13,184,000

Population-5,530,000

BOTSWAKA-1966 Seretse Khama, Pres. Population-618,000

SURUNDI-1962 Col. Michel Micombers, Pres. Population=3,442,000

CAMEROON-1960 Ahmadou Ahio, ... Pres. Population-5,685,000

Population-224,000

CAPE VERDE ISLANDS-Port. Overseas Prov

CENTRAL AFRICAN REP-1980

Gen. Jean Bedel Bokassa, Pres. Population-1,513,000

CHAD-1960 Francois Tombalbaye, Pres. Population-3,492,000

CONGO-1960 Mcj. Marien Ngouabi, Pres. Population-875,000

DAHOMEY-1960 Major Mathieu Kereko Population-2,587,000

EGYPT-1922 Muhammad Ahmad Anwar al-Sadat, Population~32,088,000

EQUATORIAL GUINEA-1868 Francisco Macias, Pres Population-265,000

ETHOPIA Haile Selassie, Emperor Population-24,161,000

FRENCH TERRITORY OF THE AFARS AND IBSAS (F.T.A.I.) French Overseas Territory Population-81,000

GABON-1960 Albert Bongo, Pres. Population-481,000

GAMBIA-1985 Dawde Jawara, Prime Minister Population-354,000

GHANA-1987 Col. I. K. Acheampong, Chairman, National Redemption Council Population—8,450,000

QUINEA-1958 Sekou Toure, Pres. Population-3,648,000

IVORY COAST-1960 Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Pres. Population-4,149,000

KENYA-1983 Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Ministe Population=10,425,000

LESOTHO-1966 Leabus Jonathan, Prime Minister Population-924,000

Wm. Richard Tolbert, Jr., Pres. Population-1,141,000

LIBYA-1861 Mu'amn or Al-Qaddati, Pres. Revolutionary Command Council Population=1,834,000

MALAGASY REP.-1980 Gcn. Gabriel Ramanantson Population-6,582,000

MALAWI-1964 Hastings Kamuzu Benda, Pres. Population=4,370,000

MAU-1960 Col. Moussa Traore, Pres., Military Committee of National Liberation Population—4.885,000

MAURITANIA-1980 Moktar Ould Daddah, Pres. Population-1,147,000

MAURITIUS-1968 Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister Population - 797,000

MOROCCO-1886 Hassan II, King Papulation=14,840,000

MOZAMBIQUE Portuguese Overseas Prov Population - 7.252.000

NIGER-1960 Hamani Diori, Pres. Population-3,723,000

NIGERIA-1960 Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Head, Fedoral Military Government Population-61,450,000

PORTUGUESE GUINEA Portuguese Overseas Prov Population-528,000

RÉUNION - French Oversons Territory Population-433,000 RWANDA-1562

Gregoire Kayıbanda, Pres. Population=3,486,000

SENEGAL-1960 Leopold Sedar Senghor, Pres. Population-3.810,000

SIERRA LEONE-1961 Siaka Stevena, Pres. Population-2,494,000

50MALIA-1960 Supreme Revolutionary Council Population = 2,785,000

SOUTH AFRICA-1910 B. John Vorster, Prime Minister Population-19:406,000

SOUTHERN RHODESIA British Colony (self-governing) lan Smith, Prime Minister (de facto) Population-4,733,000

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA Declared International Territory by U.N.

Administered Rep of S Africa Population-609,000

SPANISH SAHARA Spanish African Prov. Population-48,000

8UDAN-1286 Ja'far al-Numayri, Pres. Revolutionary Comma-opulation-15,002,000 **SWAZILAND-1968** Sobhuza II, King Population-401.000

TANZANIA-1961 Julius Nyerere, Pres. Population-12,703,000

TOGO-1960 Brig Gen Etienne Eyadema, Pres. Population-1,792,000

TUNISIA-1956 Habib Bourguiba, Pres Population-4,714,000

UGANDA-1962 Gen. Idi Amm, Pres. Population-8,235,000

UPPER VOLTA-1960 Brig. Gen. Sangoule Lamizana, Pres. Population-5,205,000

ZAIRE~1960 Mobulu Sese Seko Population-16,921,000

ZAMBIA-1964 Kenneth Kaunda, Pres Population~4,135,000

Date of independence follows country name. Population figures based on United Nations mid-1969 data.

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Incentives for Closer Cooperation

Prior to Africa's march to nationhood and during the early years of its first decade of independence, Pan-African propagandists, epitomized by the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, glamorized the ideal of ultimate African political and economic integration. Practical considerations, however, have led to a shift from the original conception of Pan-Africanism that called for immediate continental union to a gradualist approach that would begin with economic cooperation at the subregional level. From there, accelerating economic development could progress to eventual political unity. Underlying the Africans' aspiration to broad cooperation is a loose sense of community built around the widely shared experience of colonial rule and cemented by the continued presence in Africa of racist white minority regimes.

As the need for accelerated economic development and collective political influence becomes more and more apparent, the emergent African states are viewing expanding cooperation with a greater sense of urgency and realism. A trend toward greater African self-reliance in seeking solutions to African problems is leading many of the countries—especially in West Africa—to re-examine established patterns in their relations with each other and with the outside world. Increasingly, the African states want to alter relationships that perpetuate neo-colonialism.

The African countries' interest in regionalism has been spawned by heavy economic dependency on former European colonizers, by the declining position of Africa in the priorities of the developed nations, and by Africa's inability to advance its interests internationally. Expanded inter-African cooperation seems to offer hope for easing Africa's heavy reliance on Western markets, aid, investment, and expertise, as well as for enabling Africa to achieve some influence as an international bloc. Moreover, it is seen as helping to compensate for generally declining levels of foreign economic assistance and the lack of great power action against colonialism and white racist regimes in Africa.

Barriers to Unity

The obstacles to unity are no less real than a decade ago. Indeed, in certain respects, they have become more formidable. Today the continent is more of a mosaic than ever, encompassing 42 independent nations with sweeping political, social, and economic differences. Centrifugal forces have prevented more sweeping regional groupings, such as the once proposed West African Regional Group, and have periodically threatened, or actually forced, the dissolution of several lesser ones.

African countries seem increasingly wedded to the idea of sovereignty and are deeply absorbed in the basic task of forging internal unity. Such factors as conflicting national interests, the ideological gulf between progressive and moderate governments, frequent changes of regime, and territorial and other disputes make it all the more difficult to muster the will to cooperate more closely. Major cultural and linguistic divisions between the former French and British territories, on the one hand, and the Arab countries of North Africa and the black states south of the Sahara, on the other, are still firmly fixed, and misunderstandings remain very much alive.

The barriers to intra-African trade that originated in the colonial era persists. African economies are based mainly on exports of competing, rather than complementary, agricultural and mineral products that almost invariably go to the former metropole, which remains the principal supplier of manufactured products. Moreover, the African countries are aligned against one another in non-convertible currency arrangements and preferential customs groupings. Indeed, the Paris-dominated African franc zone of 14 former French colonies effectively prevents its members from pursuing independent fiscal and monetary policies that are contrary to the interests of the French Government in Francophone Africa. In most cases, direct communications with Europe are easier than with adjoining states. On top of



Ekah-Nghaky
Secretary General of
Organization of African Unity

this, the growing economic disparities between Africa's wealthier countries and their poorer neighbors make it increasingly difficult to agree on a formula for distributing the costs and benefits of mutual undertakings.

Attempts at Continental Unity

The Organization of African Unity and the African Development Bank stand as testaments to the ideal of Pan-Africanism. Concentrating its loose consultative energies in the political field, the Organization of African Unity has attempted to pull Africa together and to keep its fractious members at peace. It has also been the spokesman for the region and has overseen the continent's struggle against


racist and colonial rule. The organization may possibly become more effective under its second secretary general, Cameroonian Nzo Ekhah-Nghaky who was elected last June to replace the mercurial Diallo Telli of Guinea. Among other things, the new secretary general hopes to strengthen economic cooperation in Africa.

The annual summit of chiefs of state provides a stage for Africa's unity to be proclaimed anew and injects a certain spirit of cooperation, however transitory it may be. As an articulator of African opinion and a lobbyist for African interests, the organization manages to project enough moral authority on important issues to focus greater regional and world attention on African problems, though it succeeds in producing few concrete changes. The organization enjoys observer status in the UN, and the African group there functions as the OAU's informal UN arm.

At times the Organization of African Unity has managed to patch up minor quarrels between member states, but it is generally ineffective in coping with serious African problems, and last year's maiden venture into Middle East conciliation is not likely to be repeated soon. Nonetheless, most African countries look to the Organization of African Unity first for mediation, and it has become a more obvious force against unilateral boundary changes and secessionist movements.

The organization, hampered by the bickering of its members and the paucity of financial support, has so far contributed little beyond rhetoric to the various Airican freedom movements. Agreement has yet to be reached on a common defense policy to deal with military reprisals by white-ruled countries against their African neighbors who harbor and give varying degrees of support to insurgents. Even so, the decolonization resolutions are becoming progressively stronger, and with each passing year the pressure grows for meaningful and decisive action.

The organization backs the UN's Economic Commission for Africa, which has undertaken the coordination of Africa's economic and social development. Answerable only to UNESCO, the commission shares its accommodations in Addis Ababa with the Organization of African Unity. A Ghanaian, Robert Gardiner, who is one of Africa's most able economists, is the commission's chairman. Despite the economic commission's resistance to political direction from the OAU, liaison between the two is improving, and the commission is trying to move beyond research and planning to operational activities, such as the projected Trans-African Highway from



African Hall in Addis Ababa

Mombasa, Kenya to Lagos, Nigeria. The commission has already done much to persuade African governments to harmonize their policies and has established several new cooperative institutions like the African Development Bank.

The African Development Bank, the world's smallest regional bank in terms of both resources and activity, is getting ready to assume the financial and technical role assigned it. Since taking over in 1970, the bank's second president, Tunisian Abdel Wahab Labidi, has moved energetically to enhance its potential. The predominantly European staff is being upgraded and the training of Africans is being accelerated to impart a more distinctively African operational approach. With Libya's application to join, the bank's capital subscription goal of \$250 million has been nearly realized. Fewer members are in arrears and loan commitments have doubled. Political hurdles to participation of non-Africans in the bank remain, but two outside-funded affiliates with possible resources of \$100 million have been set up; an investment corporation of private banks and the multi-national African Development Fund, which will offer soft loans.

Robert K. A. Gardiner Chairman of Economic Commission for Africa



Abdel Wahab Labidi President of African Development Bank



The Larger Regional Groupings

Embracing parts of several subregions, the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization and the Conference of East and Central African States are modestly successful, though unspectacular, groupings. There is some overlapping of membership. The Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization, built with French backing around a core of moderate former French colonies in West and Central Africa, is mainly an economic service association with cultural sidelines. France's use of the organization to help preserve its influence in Africa was the reason cited by Zaire and Congo for their withdrawal this year. The organization does not try to resolve bilateral quarrels between its members and exercises little influence on the Organization of African Unity, Functional cooperation in agriculture and air transport is encountering difficulties, and proposals for common industrial projects have gone nowhere.

This regional grouping excels, however, as an advocate of its members' economic interests before international organizations. It regularly presents a common front, endorses candidates for posts, and keeps members abreast of

developments. In its capacity as the semi-official spokesman of the 19 African EC associates, the group wants to extend contacts with the English-speaking Commonwealth nations that have been offered various kinds of EC association. Senegal's Leopold Senghor, the current president of the organization, hopes a majority of the Commonwealth countries will opt for a comprehensive type of association with the EC. This, he believes, would reduce barriers to intra-African trade and enhance Africa's political weight.

The loosely structured Conference of East and Central African States is mainly an annual exercise in good-neighborliness, but it has attracted a slowly growing membership. Meetings provide a useful forum for bilateral talks and for conciliating disputes. The geographical location of the member states and the preponderance of progressive governments lead to a special interest in liberating white-ruled southern Africa; the conference's increasingly militant stand helps on occasion to toughen the positions of the Organization of African Unity. On the other hand, nothing tangible is emerging from the unhurried committees set up to study possible joint action in various development fields.

West Africa: Moving Together or Further Apart?

Once again the nations of West Africa are trying to achieve closer cooperation by refurbishing old subregional organizations and erecting new ones. More subregional groupings already exist in West Africa than anywhere else on the continent. They are mainly the handiwork of the area's small French-speaking states; among West Africa's English-speaking countries, only Nigeria is attempting to play a major regional role.

The two basic groupings of West Africa are those sponsored by its senior Francophone leaders, presidents Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Senghor of Senegal. The Council of Entente, fashioned by Houphouet-Boigny as a loose political association, is held together by its modest economic activities. Houphouet's partners do not always back his foreign policy initiatives, and they are somewhat dissatisfied with the Entente's economic limitations. The mutual aid and guarantee fund underwritten by Ivory Coast has provided its poor associates with few new development projects and little more in foreign investments, while the market and labor supply offered by the Entente are substantial contributors to Ivorian prosperity. Until Niger, Togo, Dahomey, and Upper Volta perceive more tangible benefits elsewhere, however, the Entente is unlikely to fall apart, and Houphouet will continue to adapt the organization to meet the minimal needs of its members.

Senghor's assemblage seems at last to be on a sound foundation. Recast this year as the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River, it is billed as an improved model of the Organization of the Senegal River States, which was formed in 1968 and broke up three years later over political differences between Senegal and Guinea. The new organization is more narrowly focused and administratively more streamlined than its predecessor, and Guinea has so far been excluded from the group. Mali threatens to re-raise the contentious issue of Guinean membership, however, and, if it does so, this could be disruptive. Moreover, if the organization is to succeed in getting its long-stalled program under way, it must find international funding for such expensive projects as the proposed Manantali dam.

The ineffective West African Customs Union, which includes all ex-French territories of West Africa except Guinea and Togo, is to be superseded if and when the West African Economic Community becomes operational. A pre-independence convention of 1959 called for a total customs union with free internal trade and a common external tariff, but this proposal was later modified as the members progressively retreated from so large a commitment. Because of its inability to establish a common customs policy, the union has given only a marginal boost to inter-member trade and economic development.



President Houphouet-Boigny Ivory Coast



President Senghor Senegal

The West African Economic Community is a more ambitious version of the West African Customs Union. It has set a tall task for itself. The treaty signed last June establishing the organization is to be amended and ratified this December. Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny, the prime movers behind the West African Economic Community, and the French Government view the grouping as a Francophone counterweight to the growing strength and influence of Nigeria. They are cautious about any early inclusion of West Africa's English-speaking countries in the grouping, which initially will have the same membership as the West African Customs Union, but which theoretically is open to participation by any state in the area.

The less developed countries in the community, coastal Mauritania and Dahomey and inland Niger, Upper Volta, and Mali, are already seeking special arrangements to preserve their growing economic relations with neighboring Anglophone and Arab states and to guarantee a fair distribution of the community's benefits. The landlocked states also want the immediate inclusion of the English-speaking countries (all of which are on the coast), although none appears ready to join. If the community retains its present proposed form, its long-term future would seem to be in doubt.

The frustration of the community's inland states is reflected in the expansion of their fledgling Liptako-Gourma Authority. Established to develop the Liptako-Gourma region, which encompasses northern Upper

Volta and adjacent areas in Mali and Niger, the authority might with time supplant the Entente's functions in meat marketing and grain stabilization. The authority has only begun to search for outside financing, however, and few of its dreams are likely to be realized.

Nigeria's answer to the West African Economic Community was an economic union with French-speaking Togo, which is envisioned by General Gowon as an alternative nucleus for a subregional economic grouping. Gowon plans to invite all West African leaders to Nigeria in November for a conference to discuss an acceptable institutional framework for cooperation. Dahomey, wedged between Togo and Nigeria, and Niger have even stronger



General Gowon Nigeria

economic ties with Nigeria than does Togo, and doubtless are attracted by the idea. They probably will not risk displeasing Paris, however, by joining such an inauspicious undertaking.

West and Central Africa: Tentative Bridges

The Niger River Commission, one of the two predominantly Francophone groups that include English-speaking Nigeria and that bridge West and Central Africa, has proved unwieldly and ineffective. Niger's great enthusiasm for the grouping is not shared by the other West African countries, particularly Guinea and Dahomey. The commission has not progressed beyond trying to agree on concrete projects for submission to potential aid donors.

Nigeria and Cameroon are giving greater attention to the Lake Chad Basin Commission, already of concern to equatorial Chad, and the grouping is taking on more functions in spite of Niger's indifference. A development fund, proposed by Nigeria, is being created, and Cameroon has approved the grouping's long-stalled telecommunications and roads projects. Specialized agencies concerned with agricultural and livestock production have also been established. So long as the member's new-found willingness to adapt their national objectives to the commission's regional program continues, and an adequate level of international funding is maintained, the grouping should gradually become more effective.

Central Africa: Mixed Success

The Central African Customs and Economic Union is the preferred regional vehicle of the former French equatorial countries, except for Chad. This grouping, which grew out of the French colonial equatorial customs union, is committed to a more balanced integration than that envisaged in the projected West African Economic Community. Even so, the Central African Customs and Economic Union is progressing very slowly, and its provisions for equal benefits for all members still function imperfectly. As a result of this disparity, Chad withdrew four years ago and the Central African Republic temporarily defected.

Customs cooperation within the grouping is little better than that within the West African Customs Union, but a preferential single tax scheme for the few local manufacturers serving the equatorial region has provided a mild stimulus to interstate trade in industrial goods. Joint industrial planning efforts continue, and two union oil refineries, now under construction, will soon be added to the one already existing in Libreville.

Chad remains linked with Zaire in the inert Union of Central African States. Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko's hope that the union would grow into a grouping of all ex-French and ex-Belgian territories in central African has never materialized. With the return of the Central African Republic to the Central African Customs and Economic Union in late 1968 and the refusal of Burundi and Rwanda to join, the Union of Central African States is left with two non-contiguous members having little in common. Mobutu's attempt in 1969 to forge a separate organization with Burundi and Rwanda also was unsuccessful primarily because of the strong tribal animosity between the two mini-states and their fear of further Zairian economic domination.

East Africa: Marking Time

The East African Community's fabric of cooperation has become unraveled in recent years. Erected around a customs union and common services established under British rule, and with some quasi-governmental functions and institutions, the community started out as the most comprehensive and promising regional organization in Africa. Although Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda still derive certain common benefits from its operation, they are reluctant to move toward further integration. Unless the original spirit of mutual cooperation and short-term sacrifice is rekindled, the community probably will have to be restructured if it is to stay afloat.

Political differences pose the most immediate problem. One obstacle is Tanzanian President Nyerere's continuing refusal to recognize, or even meet with, Uganda's General Amin. Tanzania's commitment to socialism and Kenya's to capitalism pose a larger if less immediate barrier to closer cooperation. These political uncertainties have prevented communi'y action on pending applications for membership from Zambia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Burundi for four years.

Also unsolved are the economic problems of distributing development costs and benefits among more industrialized Kenya and its less endowed partners. While the community has helped boost inter-state trade and East African exports, rising economic competition of the members is preventing the establishment of multinational industries and has led to restrictions on the free movement of goods, capital, and workers. In the absence of policy direction, the community's role as an international lobby is also suffering.

Kenya has been the main beneficiary of a tri-state market, while Tanzania and Uganda have profited disproportionately from joint transport

and telecommunications services and the East African Development Bank. Kenya has recently come to question the whole East African Community arrangement. Not only has Kenya's Tanzanian market been disrupted by the influx of Chinese goods, but, more important, its Ugandan market, Kenya's largest, has been dislocated by General Amin's policies. Tanzanian and Ugandan arrears to East African Airways have led Kenya to consider going it alone on a national airline.

North Africa: Inching Along

Libya under President Qadhafi has veered in the direction of Egypt and the eastern Arab states, but the other countries of the Maghreb or Arab West—Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco—are inching along toward closer economic and cultural collaboration. The Regional Economic Organization of the Maghreb provides little more than a loose framework for consultation and study. It has produced only a handful of cooperation agreements and of small joint undertakings, like the esparto grass agency.

But in recent years, the three Maghreb nations have made a determined effort to compose their differences and to create a more peaceful atmosphere. There could therefore be some progress, albeit very slow, in their joint pursuit of common interests.

Southern Africa: Reinforcing White Rule

Since 1910, when all were British territories, white-ruled South Africa and its black-governed economic satellites—Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland—have been joined in the Southern African Customs Union. The organization was revised in 1969 to accommodate black African desires for more equitable treatment and closer cooperation, but the result has been only to reinforce South Africa's hold over the three land-locked countries by providing a three-fold increase in their still small share of total customs revenues.

The union does not as yet go beyond a partial free-trade area, since the tariff-related investment incentives to spur development in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have not been implemented by South Africa. Prior consultation with the three states is presumably required, but Pretoria still unilaterally sets the union's customs rates. South Africa continues to receive indispensable African migratory labor and to enjoy protection of its industry plus privileged access to union markets. Nevertheless, the three black African states would be hard pressed without the customs union, which is their only hope for increased development capital and expanding exports.

Functional Groupings


At the base of the pyramid of African regional groupings is a host of minor functional organizations that have been set up in various special fields. Since their aim is to fulfill short-term needs requiring fewer political resources, they are both the most widespread and generally the most successful inter-governmental mechanisms. A number of functional holdovers from the colonial era, such as the French-created International African Migratory Locust Organization, perpetuate the collaboration established by the former metropole.

Functional organizations usually are not specifically designed to further cooperation and integration, but there are a few exceptions. The African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, for example, has as its sole task the development of programs for training and research that will encourage economic integration.

Outlook


The limited progress that regional groupings are making in Africa is likely to continue. Although the continent's fundamental divisions and the inter-governmental squabbles over the mechanics and extent of unity will not diminish appreciably, regional collaboration will probably not suffer. Regional organizations, despite their many shortcomings, are proving to be of value, and African leaders have repeatedly acted to preserve and to improve them. The search for increased cooperation, moreover, seems here to stay.

The Organization of African Unity and the African Development Bank will probably be slowly strengthened, but the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization and the Conference of East and Central African States are not likely to become more important. Although functional groupings will continue to proliferate, the best prospects for wider African unity are at the subregional level. Experimentation with transitional groupings of small scope could eventually lead to somewhat larger and more ambitious regional efforts as the African states look for solutions to their pressing needs.



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«OAU-recognized liberation movements also attend OAU summit conferences »A United Nations body whose associate men bers include the United Kingdom ^c Non-members Congo and Mauritania sit on OCAM technical committees ^dAlgeria, Egypt, Guinea, and OAU-recognized libera «Mauritania participates as an observer in Maghrebian conferences [†] Includes France and French Territory of Afars and Issas ^g Includes Port



U-recognized liberation movements also attend OAU summit conferences. by United Nations body whose associate members include the non-self governing territories of Africa, France, Spain, and Kingdom. Non-members Congo and Mauritania sit on OCAM technical committees. Algeria, Egypt, Guinee, and OAU-recognized liberation movements are formal observers within a participates as an observer in Maghrebian conferences. Includes France and French Territory of Afairs and Issas. Includes Portuguese.